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[-] Abstract and Keywords 
This article examines long-standing debates in moral philosophy that are relevant to international human rights law. 
It discusses the political conception of human rights and the four challenges to moral philosophy which include the 
notion that no particular religious tradition or particular comprehensive doctrine (or morality) grounded human 
rights and the belief that natural rights theories end up misrepresenting and narrowing the scope of human rights. 
This article also highlights the importance of the work of moral philosophers to the understanding of contemporary 
human rights and explains that the traditions of natural rights theories still influence contemporary human rights 
language in profound ways. 
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THE twentieth century saw a remarkable shift in the attitudes and preconceptions of moral philosophers. In the first 
half of the century, few philosophers showed any interest in the analysis and theory of human rights. It seemed as 
if philosophers had discarded the idea of human rights as a confused or incoherent remnant of the past. Yet, a 
dramatic change in the fate of human rights theory appeared in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Discussions about the nature of rights, the place of rights in moral theories, and the value and justification of 
human rights, took centre stage in academic philosophy journals. This literature has become so vast and wide-
ranging that it is impossible to provide a comprehensive overview of it. This chapter, therefore, will focus on a 
number of long-standing debates in moral philosophy, indicating the interrelations between these debates, as they 
bear on the foundations of human rights. Before doing so, the chapter will begin by considering a recent challenge 
to the topic as such, one which asks whether moral philosophy has anything useful to say about the idea of human 
rights. 
1. The Political Conception of Human Rights 
The orthodox view of human rights is that they are inherent and derive simply from the fact of being human. This 
view distinguishes human rights from legal and (p. 33) conventional rights, as well as from moral rights that arise 
due to special relationships, like the right to fulfilment of a promise made. Orthodoxy further has it that ordinary 
moral reasoning suffices to determine, for example, which rights inhere in human beings. This stands to reason, 
because if rights exist independently of any convention or institutional arrangement, it is hard to conceive of 
another method through which to grasp them, apart from ordinary moral reasoning. 
Little more than a decade ago, most philosophers would have been surprised if someone asked whether moral 
philosophy were relevant to the topic of human rights. The orthodoxy has been challenged, however, by what are 
now generally known as 'political conceptions' of human rights, as John Rawls first set forth in The Law of Peoples.1 
More recently, Joseph Raz,2 Bernard Williams,3 Joshua Cohen,4 and Charles Beitz5 have presented alternative 
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versions. Political conceptions of human rights reject the idea that human rights are rights that inhere to people 
simply by virtue of them sharing a common humanity, asserting that this approach disregards the distinctively 
political role of human rights. Rawls, for example, while he does not deny that human rights belong to all human 
beings, characterizes them by the role they play in regulating relations between societies. Human rights limit 
toleration among peoples. They are 'the necessary conditions of any...cooperation',6 and they are distinguished 
from other moral rights, according to Rawls, in that their widespread violation can generate a pro tanto justification 
for forceful intervention by another (well-ordered) society.7 The immunity of any society from intervention, 
therefore, is conditioned on its respect for the rights to life, to liberty, to property, and to formal equality. This is a 
notoriously truncated list, which probably explains the unease that even Rawls's admirers have displayed towards 
his account of human rights. 
Rawls also challenged another tenet of the orthodoxy on human rights. While noting that 'comprehensive 
doctrines, religious or non-religious, might base the idea of human rights on a theological, philosophical, or moral 
conception of the nature of the human person',8 he specifically rejected the possibility of such a grounding for the 
purpose of constructing a law of peoples. He reasons that peoples from different religious, philosophical, and moral 
backgrounds should be able to (| ) agree freely on the set of principles and norms of which human rights are 
a part (ie on the law of peoples). If human rights were to be grounded in a particular comprehensive religious or 
philosophical doctrine of human nature, many peoples might reject them 'as in some way distinctive of Western 
political tradition and prejudicial to other cultures'.9 
This quote highlights one of the main motivating reasons for developing a political conception of human rights, and 
—specifically—for separating human rights theory from moral philosophy. But Rawls's conception has failed to 
convince even many of his devoted pupils, in part because of the very short list of rights that it generates. Rawls 
appears to be applying the label 'human rights' to only a sub-set of human rights proper. He does recognize a 
larger category of rights—liberal constitutional rights—which seems co-extensive with what are commonly 
identified as human rights, but his theory would come down to a proposal for enforcing only some (say, basic) 
human rights in international law, and hence it would not count as a conception of human rights. 1 0 
Charles Beitz's recent work, The Idea of Human Rights,11 has taken the political conception of human rights in a 
very different direction—one that is particularly relevant to the question of whether moral philosophy has 
something to contribute. '[H]uman rights', Beitz writes, 'names not so much an abstract normative idea as an 
emergent political practice'. 1 2 This is perplexing, inviting the question of how to distinguish the doings that 
constitute this practice, other than by saying that they are related to the idea of human rights. How something can 
be a practice and simultaneously an idea that plays a role in the same practice is rather puzzling. The claim that 
human rights is a practice might be charitably re-interpreted to mean a claim that there is a practice which consists 
of actions, institutions, etc that are in some way related to the idea of human rights. So when Beitz uses phrases 
like 'the doctrine of human rights', 'the idea of human rights', and 'the concept of human rights' one may suppose 
that he is referring to something like 'the doctrine/idea/concept inherent in the practice'. 
Beitz grants that there exist other conceptions and doctrines than the ones he identifies as inherent in the practice, 
but he thinks these are misguided insofar as they conceive of human rights 'as if they had an existence in the 
moral order that can be grasped independently of their embodiment in international doctrine and practice'. 1 3 The 
view that human rights 'express and derive their authority from some such deeper order of values' is also 
mistaken, according to Beitz. 1 4 The familiar conceptions beg questions 'in presuming to understand and criticize 
an existing normative practice on the basis of one or another governing conception that does not, (| ) itself, 
take account of the functions that the idea of a human right is meant to play, and actually does play, in the 
practice'. 1 5 This is unlikely to impress the proponents of the familiar theories, because their aim was not to 
explicate some existing practice (only Beitz claims that human rights is a practice), but rather the idea of human 
rights. The approach does, however, highlight an important question. What does it mean for some doctrine or 
conception to be inherent in a practice? How does one identify the role that the idea of human rights plays in the 
practice? If conceptions of human rights are at work in real life, they are those of the people who participate in the 
practice. Beitz would probably agree that many of these participants hold beliefs that natural rights theories aptly 
describe. People do talk about human rights as if they express and derive their authority from a deeper order of 
values, and they do—sometimes—criticize existing human rights practice on the basis of such moral beliefs. 
Moreover, Beitz does not give a good reason to think that it is impossible to characterize the idea of human rights 
as its practitioners hold it to be and to do so independently of the practice in which it is said to play a role. This is, 
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of course, exactly what many moral philosophers understand themselves to be doing. 
Obviously, explicating the idea of human rights that practitioners hold is not the same as describing the practice 
itself, although Beitz sometimes seems to insist that human rights really is the latter. It may still be the case that the 
conceptions of human rights that ordinary people have do not adequately describe the practice in which they are 
participating. If naturalistic conceptions distort our perception of human rights, as Beitz claims, this would 
presumably put into question the relevance of moral philosophy for the topic. One way of vindicating the recent 
contributions of moral philosophers, then, is to explain how these challenges can be met. The next section will 
focus in particular on four challenges: (1) the ground of human rights, (2) the scope of human rights, (3) the way 
human rights ground action, and (4) universality from the perspective of the (supposed) rights holders. 
2. Four Challenges to Moral Philosophy 
The first challenge is this: the people who drafted the Universal Declaration and subsequent treaties were 
convinced that no particular religious tradition or particular comprehensive doctrine (or morality) grounded human 
rights. 1 6 Christians may (p. 36) well believe that faith in Christ and a commitment to obey His commandments also 
requires respect for human rights, just as a Muslim may believe that Islam requires her to respect other people's 
human rights, but allegiance to human rights does not require one to become a Christian or Muslim, nor does it 
require one to renounce one's religion or to become a liberal. The problem with developing a normative theory of 
human rights, then, is that it seems to deny this stance; the idea of such a theory seems to suggest that accepting 
human rights entails endorsing the theory, and this threatens the possibility of a universal acceptance of human 
rights. This issue is too complex to fully address in this chapter, which will limit itself to attempting to demonstrate 
that moral philosophy is able to generate far more interesting and rich (better) answers to questions that political 
theories cannot address. For that reason alone, it deserves the close attention of anyone concerned with the topic. 
The second challenge is the contention that natural rights theories end up misrepresenting and narrowing the 
scope of human rights, for example, by claiming that only political and civil rights can be accorded the status of 
genuine human rights. This critique certainly applies to certain natural rights theories, although it would be too 
simplistic to dismiss such theories on the assumption that their subject is too narrow compared to our ordinary 
judgements. Moreover, the challenge does not apply to all theories. Nevertheless, there is good reason to take the 
challenge seriously, because it will reveal something important about the subject. But once again, the insight can 
only be gained by paying serious attention to moral theories. 
Thirdly, some people think that human rights are rights that citizens have against their respective government, at 
least in the first instance, and that natural rights theories cannot but deny this. Natural rights theorists should be 
worried about this challenge, even though it is mistaken, because it points to a significant problem in human rights 
theory—a problem that has been the subject of considerable debate among philosophers. It is a challenge not just 
to the natural rights approach but to anyone who takes human rights seriously. 
Finally, it is often said that rights protect interests. Universal human rights, then, protect universal human interests. 
The fourth challenge is to determine whether there are indeed interests that every human shares, and whether 
these rights can somehow be derived from human nature. In particular, one might worry that anything that can be 
derived from human nature must be something much more modest than what constitutes a comprehensive list of 
human rights. The picture that emerges from contemporary theories, however, is somewhat more complex, and 
again contains the seed of a better understanding of the dynamics of contemporary human rights discourse. 
The thrust of this chapter, therefore, is that natural or human rights theories are a rich source of insights that those 
concerned with the issue should contemplate. Before delving into the normative theories themselves, it will be 
useful to start with a topic that has generated much heat in the last half century; ie the question 'What are Rights?'. 
(p. 37) 
3. The Nature of Rights Debate 
It may seem obvious that in order to know what human rights are, we have to know what 'rights' are. Yet, in writings 
about human rights, one seldom finds that any attention is paid to the nature of rights. More often than not, texts 
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simply include a definition of 'rights' before the author swiftly moves ahead to address other questions. Many seem 
convinced that readers have a firm enough grasp of the nature of the concept. This is true enough if it means that 
persons are generally able, without hesitation, to distinguish normative incidences that are instantiations of 'right' 
(in the subjective sense) from those incidences that are not. However, seeking an answer to what makes 
something into a right, or what is common to (all) subjective rights, reveals that the matter has been highly 
contested and that there is still no widely accepted answer. Philosophers writing on the topic can be generally 
grouped into two camps. The first is composed of proponents of the 'Interest Theory' of the nature of rights, who 
hold that whenever someone has a right, this means that an interest of the right-holder is being normatively 
protected. In other words, rights protect people's well-being. Proponents of the 'Will Theory' of rights disagree, 
positing that central to the concept of a right is the idea that the holder of the right has some kind of freedom, 
autonomy, or sovereignty, which is not necessarily the case when someone's interest is being normatively 
protected. 1 7 
The obvious way to decide in favour of one theory or the other would be to consider, on the one hand, whether the 
normative incidences normally recognized as 'rights' are also captured by the theory, and, on the other hand, 
whether all normative incidences that are described by the theory as 'rights' are normally recognized as 'rights' as 
well. This 'extensional' test thus seeks to know whether the extension of the theory differs in any way from 
common-sense judgment (or, if we are considering legal rights, the judgment of lawyers and jurists). Most of the 
debate between proponents of both theories has, in fact, been a back and forth on the shortcomings of either 
theory in this respect. 
Bentham, one of the early proponents of the Interest Theory, had held that someone has a right if she 'stands to 
benefit' from the performance of a duty. 1 8 Certainly, in many cases, when people have rights they stand to benefit 
from someone else's duty in some way. A citizen would not have a (legal) right to political participation unless 
others (including the government) had duties that protect this citizen's ability to exercise her right. These duties 
would include a duty not to interfere with the citizen's attempt at exercising her right, and perhaps also duties to 
enable her (| ) to exercise the right in some way. So it seems as if standing to benefit from someone's 
performance of a duty is (often, at least) a necessary condition for recognizing someone as a right-holder. But is it 
also a sufficient condition? Consider the following example. Everyone has a duty not to murder my friend. Clearly I 
stand to benefit from the performance of this duty. But we wouldn't say that I therefore have a right that my friend 
not be murdered. My friend's right not to be murdered correlates with duties that are owed to her, not to me. So 
standing to benefit from someone's performance of a duty is not a sufficient condition for being a right-holder. Even 
if right-holders stand to benefit from someone's fulfilment of a duty, not everyone who stands to benefit from other 
people's fulfilment of a duty is a right-holder. 
Interest Theorists, from the twentieth century until recently, have geared much of their work towards solving 
problems such as these. Some of the famous attempts refer in some way to the intentions of the lawgiver or to the 
reasons that the lawgiver might have. Thus it has been suggested that a person has a right when the lawgiver 
imposes a duty in order to protect some interest of hers (or an aspect of her interest), or when an interest of hers 
is a reason to impose duties. 1 9 Yet this approach raises problems of unearthing the intentions of the lawgiver, or 
the reason for the imposition of a duty. What were the intentions of the lawgiver when murder was outlawed, and 
how will we know the reason for imposing a duty (on government officials) to provide basic education for children? 
Perhaps safeguarding a continuous supply of qualified labour for enterprises concerned the lawgiver more than the 
interests of children. It seems doubtful that any perception of an intention of the lawgiver can guide the 
identification of rights. 2 0 There is, moreover, a more serious problem that follows from speculation about the 
intentions of the lawgiver; it may lead to a conclusion that some rights are not intended to protect the interests of 
the right-holders, but are directed at the interests of others. Take the right of a journalist to withhold information on 
her sources from the police. This right clearly serves to protect the ability of the journalist to carry out her job, and 
thus it protects an interest of hers. However, it seems at least as plausible that the right to withhold information 
regarding sources arose in order to protect the interest(s) of the public at large (in a free press), rather than the 
interests of journalists in the ability to carry out their profession (even though the latter is of course a necessary 
condition for the former). 2 1 
The example just given seems to show that protecting a right-holder's interest is not always the reason for the 
existence of the right, and this presents a serious challenge to attempts to provide a definition that consists of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a right, based on the reasons for protecting an interest. To 
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be sure, not all versions of Interest Theory are of this kind; for example, (p. 39) Matthew Kramer has recently 
developed a quite different version. But, no existing version seems to capture adequately the intuitive judgements 
regarding the identification of rights. 
The most distinguished proponent of Will Theory was Herbert Hart. He thought that the characteristic feature of 
rights is that they provide the holder with some kind of control over another person's duty 'so that in the area of 
conduct covered by that duty the individual who has the right is a small-scale sovereign to whom the duty is 
owed' . 2 2 Take the right of a patient to be treated by her doctor. The doctor has a duty to treat the patient to the 
best of her ability, but the patient controls this duty in the sense that the doctor cannot do anything without the 
patient's consent. The patient also may waive or extinguish the doctor's duty. Moreover, if the doctor breaches her 
duty, the patient may choose whether to sue or not and may waive or extinguish the duty to pay compensation. 
Having some of these powers over someone else's duty makes one a small-scale sovereign and thus a right-
holder. This definition seems to capture something of the reason why the patient is considered a genuine right-
holder and not a mere beneficiary of the doctor's duty. It also captures the idea that we can exercise rights. 
However, the definition has consequences that many find disconcerting. Hart himself recognized that, according to 
his definition, criminal law did not confer rights on people. Thus, to claim a (legal) right not to be killed or not to be 
harassed on the street would at best be to use the term 'right' in a loose, imprecise way. 
The problems do not stop there. Because rights, according to Will Theory, involve some kind of control over 
someone's duty, it would seem sensible to ascribe rights only to beings that are capable of exercising such 
control. Consequently, it seems that human infants and the mentally infirm, for example, do not have rights. For 
many critics, this consequence amounts to a reductio ad absurdum of Will Theory; if a theory of the nature of 
rights denies rights to children, this can only be an indication that something has gone awfully wrong. Another 
troubling consequence of Will Theory is that it may entail in some cases that a right is lost when the law 
strengthens protection of an interest. The classic example is that of a minimum wage. Should the law require 
employers to pay employees a certain minimum wage, the right of employees can be strengthened—so it seems— 
by making workers unable to contract to work for a salary less than the minimum wage (simply by declaring any 
such contract invalid). For the Will Theory, however, it seems that such a law, by taking away the control of a 
worker, divests the worker of a right. Conversely, most of us would rather consider the rule that eliminates the 
worker's ability to contract for a lower salary as strengthening the right to a minimum wage. 
The debate between Interest Theorists and Will Theorists has raged for many decades. Although new contributions 
to the debate continue to appear, one can discern (p. 40) a sense of exasperation with the seemingly endless 
nature of the debate. One scholar concluded that the debate has ended in a stand-off, 2 3 and others have thought 
that a solution to the problem must be found in some combination or hybrid of the two theories. Before turning to 
that possibility, it is useful to consider what exactly philosophers have been doing when attempting to give an 
account of the nature of rights. There are two rather crude candidates for an answer to this question, both of which 
turn out to be unsatisfactory. This suggests that there exists a real problem here, deserving of a better response. A 
third alternative requires consideration of the historical roots of the contemporary debate on the nature of rights. 
The first answer seems to impose itself when considering the kind of objections that proponents of either account 
have raised against the competing account. Typically they have tried to show that the competing account diverges 
from linguistic intuitions on the topic of human rights—that it identifies normative incidences as rights that are not 
recognized as rights or, conversely, that it fails to classify certain normative incidences as rights that are 
commonly characterized as rights. This cannot be correct. If one could decide the disagreement by gauging the 
extensional adequacy of each account, the debate would have ended decades ago, for it must be obvious to any 
observer that Interest Theory does considerably better than Will Theory in this respect. So why has the debate 
continued? One reason is that not merely intuitions about the proper extension of the domain of rights, but also 
what one could call the intension of the concept, motivate it. This would explain why Will Theorists tend to be 
relatively untroubled by the awareness that their conception of rights effectively rules out many common-sense 
intuitions regarding the word 'right'. It also provides an explanation of why the debate seems interminable; different 
kinds of intuitions are pulling in different directions, with no obvious way to establish the weight of these different 
intuitions, making it hard to see how either side in the debate might come up with an argument that would convince 
the other side. 
The second answer considers that if some intuitions regarding 'rights' are indeed incompatible with others, then it 
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would seem necessary for the purpose of scholarly debate to narrow down the use of the term, perhaps so that it 
refers to the largest consistent subset of those intuitions. This would involve more or less consciously ruling out 
some intuitions as improper, thus stipulating away some of the intuitions (preferably as few as possible) in order to 
distil a vocabulary suitable for academic discourse. This suggestion may make sense of the continued existence of 
different definitions of 'rights', but it generates a huge problem of intelligibility. How is it possible for intelligent 
individuals to debate stipulative definitions for decades? Of course, some stipulative definitions may be closer to 
the usage of a word in ordinary language (or in legal discourse), but such observations could not obtain the status 
they have acquired in the nature of rights debate, namely that of casting doubt on (| ) the acceptability of the 
definition. At the least, semblance to linguistic intuitions could only be one of a set of criteria among other criteria, 
such as coherence and clarity, by which to judge the usefulness of a definition of rights. The most effective 
defence of a stipulative definition would be to show that it is (or could be) part of a powerful theory, but proponents 
of either account have not tried to make this argument. Instead of using their respective definition to build a theory 
on the topic, they have baptized their definitions with the label 'theory' and have argued that it corresponds better 
to intuitions in comparison with other definitions. 
If neither response makes sense of the debate, other options must be considered. There is good reason to think 
that the debate is misguided; Interest Theory and Will Theory are better seen as attempting to capture different 
kinds of rights. 2 4 If that is correct, neither Interest Theory nor Will Theory is a genuine account of 'rights' and 
therefore to ask which of the two definitions of rights is the correct one is to ask a pseudo-question. This raises two 
important questions: first, if two different kinds of rights ('Interest Theory rights' and 'Will Theory rights') exist, is it 
more than linguistic coincidence that we call them both rights? Or, to put the question differently, what makes both 
kinds of rights, rights? The first is a question for a better conceptual analysis. Second, why has the debate taken 
this particular shape? This is a question about the historical roots of the debate. I would like to suggest that both 
kinds of rights are the basis of two very different theories of natural rights, and this accounts for some of the 
assumptions which have sustained the contemporary debate. 
4. New Analyses of Rights 
An increasing number of scholars, exasperated with the seemingly interminable debate between Interest Theory 
and Will Theory, have started searching for alternatives that would combine the virtues of both. These alternatives 
have taken several forms: multi-function theories, normative constraint views, capacious versions of either theory, 
and hybrid theories. 2 5 This author's own theory will be used as a starting point for the rest of the chapter. This 
analysis of rights connects the two kinds of rights in a non-ad hoc manner. In addition, there is a fit between the 
best analysis of the concept of rights and the best contemporary theories of human rights. Further, the twofold 
structure of the concept of rights parallels two very (p. 42) different theories of human rights and, historically, two 
traditions (or theories) of natural rights. These traditions have shaped not only intuitions about the proper reference 
of the word 'right', but also a broader framework of assumptions taken for granted when talking about rights. 
Consequently, it will become clear how seemingly unsolvable problems in contemporary human rights theories are 
the product of an evolution which can only be genuinely understood in light of the historical antecedents from 
which contemporary human rights theories have emerged. The upshot is that moral philosophy, if analysis and 
more than a mere superficial knowledge of the historical development of natural rights theories properly inform it, is 
indispensable in order to understand the problems that plague contemporary human rights thinking. 
A new analysis of the concept of rights, in order to be an acceptable replacement of existing analyses, should do 
better than these existing analyses in capturing intuitions about rights. Given the current state of the debate, and 
the suggestion that there are two different kinds of rights, a new analyses (1) should be extensionally at least as 
adequate as the best versions of Interest Theory; (2) should make sense of the twofold nature of the domain of 
rights; and (3) should do so in a non-ad hoc manner (ie it should explain what 'Will Theory rights' and 'Interest 
Theory rights' have in common). An analysis of rights that does this and more posits that rights enable agency and 
that they do so in two different ways. Rights ('Interest Theory rights') enable agency by removing normative 
impediments to action and by normatively protecting the interests of the agent. They also enable agency by 
granting agents normative power and, hence, by making it possible to act normatively—ie to generate normative 
changes ('Will Theory rights'). If this analysis of rights indeed solves the problems that plague Interest Theory and 
Will Theory, it serves to establish an intimate connection between rights and agency. And, as it happens, this link 
between rights and agency is also an enduring feature of the best theories of human rights. 
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If we trace the historical roots of the contemporary debate over the nature of rights, it should become clear why 
the debate has taken this particular shape. This should not be understood as a mere historical claim. In the 
following section, it will become clear that no single natural rights theory can accommodate 'Will Theory rights' and 
'Interest Theory rights'—even though both are normative incidences that enable agency—at least not in respect to 
fundamental rights. When they are considered as natural rights, both kinds of rights give rise to normatively 
incompatible theories. This is why the history of natural rights theories can be seen as a history of two theories, 
despite the fact that historically many authors have tried to combine both kinds of rights. In the next section, right-
libertarianism is presented as the theory which takes 'Will-Theory rights' as basic. It will show that some versions of 
the theory fail to establish the conclusions they purport to establish, precisely because they have interpreted the 
rights fundamental to their theory as interest-based. For the sake of convenience, in looking at natural rights 
theories in (p. 43) which 'Will Theory rights' and 'Interest Theory rights' are embedded, the remaining sections will 
refer to natural property rights and natural rights to welfare. 
5. Human Rights as Natural Property Rights 
The contemporary version of the theory that takes fundamental human rights to be 'Will Theory rights' is 
libertarianism (or certain versions thereof), although not all libertarians have thought of libertarianism as a natural 
rights theory. The theories here share the claim that there are only negative, and not positive, moral rights. 2 6 
Negative rights are rights against interference. So there may be a negative right not to be harassed on the street, 
or a negative right not to have one's car stolen or to be prevented from entering one's home. The characteristic 
feature of negative rights is that they correlate with duties that people can discharge without actually doing 
anything—they are obligations of abstention. To enjoy the right, it suffices that everyone abstains from doing 
anything. This is what distinguishes negative rights from positive rights, for the latter sometimes requires other 
people to do something in order to discharge their duty toward the right-holder. The human right to affordable 
healthcare seems incomplete unless someone has a duty to provide affordable healthcare to me; and this would 
obviously be a positive duty, because that person or agent may have to do something in order to discharge it. 
It will be clear that libertarianism's claim that there are no positive, but only negative rights, has radical 
consequences for human rights doctrine, because it entails, for example, that there is no right to adequate 
nutrition, basic healthcare, or education. 2 7 For most persons, such consequences are counter-intuitive, and 
libertarians have not usually relied exclusively on an appeal to intuition to defend their position. One alternative 
way to defend libertarianism—particularly apt, of course, to a natural rights theory—is by appealing to human 
nature. Human beings, philosophers often say, are different from animals in the human ability to make genuine 
decisions. Genuine human action is not instinctive or impulsive, but rather based on evaluation. Reflection may 
lead to a decision not to satisfy some desires, while others are deemed worth pursuing. Developing projects or 
deciding to pursue certain complex goals may in turn generate particular new needs. The importance of this for a 
theory of natural rights is that genuine human action can be seen to require such real choices, and—crucially— 
that each individual can only make such a choice for (p. 44) herself (because nobody can determine another 
person's values or pursuits). Hence it is central to living a truly human life that one is allowed to make such choices 
and, presumably, to act on them. Thus 'Freedom of Choice', in many libertarian writings, is supposed to ground 
libertarian conclusions, but there is at least one line of argument from this idea that clearly does not deliver the 
desired conclusion, and it is important to examine why it does not. 
All persons presumably have an interest in leading a life appropriate to human beings. If making choices and acting 
on them is what is critical to being human, then surely there is an interest in being able to do so. And since these 
interests are weighty enough to deserve protection, they (at least prima facie) provide the foundation for 'Interest 
Theory rights' not to be interfered with in the exercise of one's choices. 2 8 For the libertarian, only the negative 
duty not to interfere with the freedom of another limits this right—or freedom—to do what one chooses to do. 
Grounding human rights in interests, however, does not deliver libertarian conclusions for three incontrovertible 
reasons. First, even if it is agreed that humans have an interest not to suffer interference when pursuing their aims, 
this is clearly not their only interest. In fact, it is arguably not even their most urgent interest. Before seeking to be 
free from other people's interference, individuals need to be functional human beings, which requires that one 
have access, among other things, to basic nutrition and health. If an interest in freedom grounds rights, it is hard to 
see why an interest in survival should not ground rights as well. These survival rights cannot be merely negative. 
While abstention from interference will ensure individual freedom of action, protection of the interest in sustenance 
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requires assistance from other people in those instances when persons are unable to provide for themselves. This 
in itself is enough to dismiss those versions of libertarianism which aim to ground rights in interests. 
The libertarian may attempt to defend the interest theory by saying that: 'Even if we have interests other than the 
interest in no one interfering with our actions, the latter still is more fundamental to a genuine human existence, and 
it therefore grounds human rights that trump other rights in case of conflict. But enforcing positive duties always 
conflicts with free choice, and this in effect makes positive rights irrelevant.' This leads to the second reason why 
the libertarian argument fails; the interest in freedom does not require that choices are never restricted. Freedom in 
a society cannot be absolute; individuals can still be free in most of what they do, even if governments collect 
income tax to provide for the needy. 
The third reason for the failure of the libertarian case for negative rights based on an interest in freedom is that this 
interest would ground positive duties. This is especially the case if this interest is thought to ground property rights. 
Libertarianism (p. 45) does not guarantee property, but if there is an interest in being able to control property, 
then there must also be an interest in having some property. More generally, an interest in freedom exists because 
there is an interest in being able to pursue things, and the protection of this ability requires positive duties, as well 
as negative ones. 
As may be obvious by now, attempts to ground libertarianism in human interests fail because the intuitions which 
underlie the theory are of a different kind. Libertarianism is not a theory of rights based on interests, but a theory of 
fundamental property rights. To fully understand this idea, it is helpful to see how it developed historically. By the 
early fourteenth century, the Franciscan religious order had been embroiled for decades in a dispute over the 
spiritual foundation of their order. The Franciscans distinguished themselves from other religious orders in that they 
claimed not to own anything, either individually or in common. They even claimed not to have any (legally 
enforceable) right to the things they used. In the language of the period, the Franciscans sought to live a life 
without any dominium (lordship). Pope John XXII strongly attacked this doctrine, and in one of his writings, he 
claimed that Adam, the first human being, already had exclusive dominium of temporal things. 2 9 A Dominican 
cleric, John of Paris, had suggested some two decades earlier that true dominium is not dependent on human law, 
because it is the result of labour. 3 0 Two decades later, German theologian Konrad von Megenberg would make a 
very similar claim. 3 1 It seems that the core of the labour theory of property, now associated with John Locke, was 
already emerging three-and-a-half centuries earlier. 
In Roman law, dominium referred to the actual control of a landlord (a dominus) over his property. However, in the 
later Middle Ages, the meaning of dominium expanded in at least two ways. First, it came to mean any form of 
normative control, so that anyone having a legal right could be said to have a kind of dominium. Second, it came 
to refer to the control of a human being over her faculties. Aquinas, for example, held that the dominium of man 
over his own will makes him capable of dominium over other things. 3 2 In the sixteenth century, these ideas were 
further developed into a full-fledged theory of fundamental property rights (allowing for (p. 46) a very wide sense 
of 'property', so that it encompassed the fundamental right of a people to its own jurisdiction) during the fierce 
dispute over the rights of the American 'Indians'. The Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria argued that even a 
sinner 'does not lose dominion (dominium) over his own acts and his body'. 3 3 For Vitoria this was demonstrably 
true, because many observers had agreed that the 'Indians' had built cities and ordered their affairs; the 'Indians' 
were not simply running around like brutes. This was enough for Vitoria to conclude that the Spanish conquistadors 
were not entitled to appropriate any indigenous property or to subject them forcefully to the Spanish king. In sum, 
for Vitoria, the mere fact of having control (dominium) over one's will seemed to entail having dominium, in the 
sense of normative control (rights) over one's possessions, and dominium, in the sense of the normative control of 
a community over itself, entailing immunity from being subjected to a ruler that one has not chosen oneself. 3 4 
Contemporary intuitions regarding fundamental property rights are the descendants of the idea that human beings 
have dominium over their will and actions, and therefore over parts of the outside world. The best support for this 
claim is that the idea generates a theory of fundamental property rights that is more adequate than its contenders. 
Two ideas (both of which Locke used) have been at the forefront in recent debates over the justification for 
fundamental property rights: one is the labour theory of property acquisition, and the other is the idea that one can 
acquire property if one leaves 'enough and as good'. The latter has been the subject of intense debate. 3 5 The 
problem with the 'Lockean proviso' is that no one has up to now been able to give it specific content that will allow 
it to function as a criterion of just appropriation in the state of nature. 3 6 However, the proviso—even if one were to 
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develop a workable version—only restricts legitimate acquisition; it does little or nothing to justify property 
acquisition. References to labour usually play this role, and the mixing-labour argument for property acquisition is 
notoriously problematic. 
One problem with the labour theory is that in many cases it fails to provide an adequate reference to what is 
acquired: how much labour is required, and what exactly has an individual mixed with her labour when she has 
built a fence around a piece of land? 3 7 More importantly, it remains unclear how the mixing argument justifies 
appropriation at all. How could it, for example, justify acquisition of land? Moreover, the argument from labour 
mixing seems to presuppose self-ownership. A theory of fundamental property rights should first try to make sense 
of the intuition that human beings are self-owners and owners of things they have made, as (p. 47) well as the 
intuition that individuals can appropriate external goods, including natural resources and parts of land. All this can 
be done by assuming that the underlying notion is that human beings incorporate things into plans. The medieval 
theory discussed above connects the ability to have dominium to free will and hence to intentional behaviour. This 
approach makes sense even of such difficult questions as why humans own themselves (they use their own body 
purposively) and how they can acquire property in resources and land (both can play an essential part in human 
projects). The crucial idea here is that of creation. 3 8 In other words, the idea that human beings are sovereigns 
secularizes the idea that God has dominium over the universe because he has created it. This in turn suggests 
questioning whether these ideas have any place in a secular world. Similar doubts emerge when examining the 
basis of natural rights to welfare. 
6. Natural Rights to Welfare 
Authors of current human rights texts often lament the proliferation of human rights claims, apparently fearing that 
too many claims will erode the special status of human rights. In common discourse, a human rights violation is 
perceived as particularly grave, associated with genocide and war crimes, rather than, for example, the lack of a 
smoke-free environment. If all that people desire to claim from their government is called a human right, then the 
sense of urgency normally attached to human rights will surely dissipate. More dangerously, if human rights claims 
cannot be distinguished from other human desires, this may foment scepticism towards the language of human 
rights as such. The responses of moral philosophers to this situation can be divided into three categories. A 
minority does not see proliferation as problematic. A second group consists mostly of libertarians who think that the 
only sensible conception of human rights is that of natural property rights discussed above. Many of them view 
proliferation as the result of misconceiving rights as anything other than civil and political rights. 3 9 A third group 
consists of philosophers who share a broader view of human rights, but who think that philosophy has a role to fulfil 
in distinguishing rights claims from other claims. 
One way to evaluate these responses is by bringing in the second challenge to natural rights theories—the claim 
that these theories end up misrepresenting the (p. 48) scope of human rights. This claim has some initial 
plausibility when levelled against the theories of fundamental property rights discussed in the previous section, but 
it is much less obviously true with regard to theories that construe natural rights as protecting interests of human 
beings. These theories are often critical of the more extravagant rights-claims and hence do not aim to merely 
describe actual human rights discourse. However, in light of the widespread belief that the domain of human rights 
is becoming overstretched, it seems too rash to rule them out as serious attempts to describe the phenomenon of 
human rights on this basis alone. To do so would be to deny that the belief is as much part of contemporary human 
rights discourse as the more extravagant right claims. When looking carefully at theories of natural rights to 
welfare, however, it becomes apparent that they do not succeed in stopping the proliferation of human rights. 
Theories of 'natural rights to welfare' come in many different varieties. One theory that has attracted considerable 
attention recently is the 'capabilities approach' to human rights. Martha Nussbaum, for example, has argued that 
humans need certain capabilities in order to lead a fully human l i fe. 4 0 However, it is far from clear how this criterion 
might lead to a more or less determinate list of capabilities that deserve to be protected as human rights. The most 
promising versions of the theory start from the idea that the fact that human beings are agents distinguishes them 
from other beings. Thus, the starting point of these theories is very similar to that of the theory of natural property 
rights: human beings are distinct from other beings, because humans can evaluate their desires and urges and 
choose the projects they want to pursue. Since leading a fully human life is leading the life of an agent, these 
theories posit, human rights entitle each person to the things needed in order to be functioning agents. This 
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suggestion grounds rights to adequate nutrition, to healthcare, to (basic) education, to freedom, etc. 
Theories of welfare rights that base these rights on the notion of agency face the obvious objection that not all 
human beings are agents. Most significantly, infants are not agents in the relevant sense. In response to this 
objection, some theorists have simply bitten the bullet and maintained that not all human beings, only agents, have 
rights. 4 1 If this result is hard to accept, one can extend the theory by arguing that human rights protect not only 
existing agency but also the coming into being of human agents. 4 2 Unfortunately, that addition doesn't solve the 
problem; some human beings (p. 49) never have been or never will be agents. Conversely, some animals may 
possess the capacities associated with agency. Intuitions regarding human rights, however, are that all and only 
human beings have human rights, a conclusion not captured by a theory that grants rights to agents and potential 
agents. 
Another problem with these theories—one that has given rise to an extensive literature—is that they give rise to 
positive rights (ie rights that entail positive duties). The right to medical healthcare implies that someone has a duty 
to provide it. Now it may well be possible, in the twenty-first century, to provide adequate nutrition and perhaps 
even basic healthcare for everyone, but this has not always been the case, and it is not something that can be 
taken for granted even for the future. Most philosophers agree that there is no duty to do something if it cannot be 
performed. Therefore, if people living in the third quarter of the twentieth century were unable to feed the world 
population, they could not have had a duty to do so. 4 3 Consequently, if they did not have this duty, then no one 
had a right to adequate nutrition. This result does not sit squarely with the idea that human rights are universal in 
both time and space, and libertarians have used it to argue that human rights must therefore be negative rights 
only. Friends of welfare rights have taken different approaches to avert this conclusion. First, some have tried to 
blur the distinction between positive and negative rights, arguing that the protection of negative rights also entails 
positive duties. 4 4 Second, others have argued that positive rights do not require everyone to act; they merely 
require support for institutions that provide the things that people have a right t o . 4 5 Third, some have held that 
humans only have duties to do what is in their power to provide the things to which people have rights. 4 6 Fourth, it 
has been suggested that humans only have rights to those things that are effectively enforceable. 4 7 None of these 
responses solve the problem, however, leaving a seemingly incoherent conception of human rights. (p. 50) 
The third problem is the most serious. Surely, if a theory of human rights is to be of any use at all, it should provide 
a solid basis on which to distinguish real from 'supposed' human rights. At first sight, this is exactly what these 
theories do. They claim that humans have a right only to the things necessary to be an agent, ie to the things 
needed to be able to develop and pursue a conception of the good. 4 8 This requires autonomy (the ability to 
develop a conception of the good), some amount of welfare (enough to protect the ability to pursue each person's 
conception of the good), and freedom. The crucial question, however, is: how much of each is required? It is clear 
that autonomy comes in many different degrees, and it is far from clear how reference to the idea of human 
agency can provide anything close to a precise limit to the level of education to which human rights entitle each 
individual. 4 9 Similarly, it is unclear how rights to welfare can be derived with any amount of precision from the 
requirement that individuals must be able to function as agents. In one sense of 'agency', it seems that neither 
education nor welfare is necessary, except in extreme circumstances. After all, most human beings, no matter how 
uneducated or poor they happen to be, are still functioning agents. The same goes even more for freedom. 
Someone who is unjustly imprisoned does not lose agency in the process. If this sense of agency is taken as a 
guideline, the result will be a list of human rights that is even thinner than Rawls's. In fact, it would be 
unrecognizable as a list of human rights. However, contrary to what might be expected, these theorists actually 
generate very extensive lists of human rights. Griffin, recognizing the difficulty, writes that his account of rights has 
an 'ampler' conception of agency at its heart, which includes both having certain capacities and exercising them. 
He recognizes that this provides a highly indeterminate list of human rights, and so he suggests considering 
'practicalities' in order to make it more determinate. The same is true for Gewirth. He requires that the means of 
acquiring wealth and income be distributed equally so far as possible. Thus it turns out that these theories, rather 
than constraining the proliferation of human rights, provide either highly indeterminate or sheer limitless accounts 
of the things individuals are entitled to as human rights. 5 0 
The persistence of these problems would suggest that they are inherent to any theory of welfare rights. However, 
there is a religious version of the theory that is (p. 51) not troubled by them. Brian Tierney is one of several 
historians who have suggested that throughout the early history of natural rights theories, rights were persistently 
linked not with the ability to develop projects, but with the idea of conscience. 5 1 The importance of this difference 
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can hardly be over-emphasized. A sense of obligation to obey God's commandments, as well as an idea that 
human beings have a role to fulfil in God's plan for the world, pervaded Medieval European culture. It was natural 
for Christians to assume that God had given each and every individual the talents needed to carry out their duties. 
It was also commonly assumed that God had given the earth and its produce so that humans may be nourished. 
Under these conditions, rights to subsistence could be construed as negative rights—ie the right that others not 
take more than what they need, in case doing so would prevent another from surviving. In fact, from the thirteenth 
century onwards, there was a stable consensus among canon lawyers, theologians, and Roman lawyers, to the 
effect that, in times of necessity, every human being had a right to take whatever was needed in order to survive. 
Since this was a negative right, it did not suffer from the problems associated with positive human rights. Also, 
Christians did not need to tie this right to any human capacity; nobody doubted that all human beings, and only 
human beings, had this special role in God's plan. The stable consensus (from the thirteenth century on to at least 
the second half of the seventeenth century) to the effect that this right only applied to cases of extreme necessity 
is only natural given these assumptions. The idea was not—as in modern, secular theories—that humans have 
these rights in order to carry out their own plans. Rather, the idea was that individuals should be able to perform 
their role in God's plan. Thus, the problems that seem so incontrovertible in the context of modern theories did not 
plague this religious version of natural rights to welfare. This suggests—again—that the problems are due to the 
secularization of the original theories. 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to show the importance of the work of moral philosophers to the understanding of 
contemporary human rights. The underlying conviction guiding the story is that the traditions of natural rights 
theories, as they have developed (p. 52) since the thirteenth century, still influence contemporary human rights 
language in profound ways. These traditions continue to shape debates from that of the nature of rights to attempts 
to answer questions like 'Which rights do we have?' or 'Who is responsible for delivering the things to which we are 
entitled?'. Failure to recognize this theoretical foundation results in an impoverished understanding of the current 
condition and (theoretical) problems. 
The answer to the first challenge against the relevance of moral philosophy has been the article as a whole. It may 
well be that those who prepared the Universal Declaration of 1948 shared a strong conviction that they were 
creating a new language, but that does not preclude unearthing the ways in which traditions found in the abundant 
work of moral philosophers have moulded both the concept and theory of human rights. 
The second challenge—that moral philosophy ends up misrepresenting the scope of human rights—requires a 
qualified response. Certain theories certainly generate lists that diverge significantly from the rights ordinarily 
identified as human rights. 5 2 Other theories, however, expose almost exactly the same indeterminacy as can be 
found in contemporary human rights discourse. The stance of this chapter has been that studying these theories is 
rewarding in that it can expose the dynamics that drive the discourse. 
The third challenge—that natural rights theories misrepresent the distinctly political character of human rights—can 
be answered by contending that this character has been exaggerated. It is true that governments are the most 
common violators of human rights and that special responsibilities are assigned to governments to protect human 
rights. To some extent this reflects the fact that governments are among the most powerful actors in today's world. 
Yet, locating the primary responsibility for protecting human rights with political institutions does not solve the 
immense problem with the conception of human rights as positive. An intuitive understanding of rights is at odds 
with the idea that the only genuine human rights are those that governments can in fact protect. Hence there 
remains a problem understanding how there can be positive human rights without correlative duties. 
A fully adequate response to the fourth challenge is beyond the scope of this chapter. If the historical development 
of the natural rights tradition influences human rights language and theory in profound ways, it would be surprising 
indeed if there were no significant differences in the ways in which human rights are understood and 
conceptualized in non-Western cultures. Such differences may have been of marginal political importance until 
now, but they may well become increasingly potent as the geopolitical power of many non-Western nations 
continues to grow. China, for example, has been very active in developing its own conception of human rights. 
Despite the extensive literature on 'non-Western conceptions of (p. 53) human rights', there is only rudimentary 
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understanding of these issues in the West. Scholars and activists may continue for a long time to debate whether 
the idea of human rights is distinctly Western or not. This chapter has suggested that the search for an answer to 
that question should start with a thorough study of the works of moral philosophers. 
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